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Q: Given the range of possible devas-
tating cyber disasters, what security 
measures would you recommend?
A: It depends very much on the na-
ture of the organization. A business 
should focus on protecting the busi-
ness; a government agency should fo-
cus on protecting the country.
Massive cyber attacks are certainly 
a threat. But it seems fairly well estab-
lished that they can only be launched 
by sophisticated, well-resourced adver-
saries who have ample time to prepare. 
That basically means nation-states and 
possibly terrorist and criminal organi-
zations. Such adversaries must be dealt 
with by national military and intelli-
gence agencies and by international 
collaborative efforts. Just as we never 
expected most citizens to build person-
al fallout shelters, we should not expect 
them to acquire and manage informa-
tion systems that would resist attacks 
by a determined large agency.
Governments rely also on strate-
gic doctrines such as the balance be-
tween offense and defense and their 
ability to deter aggressive acts. Those 
actions obviously influence the prob-
abilities of massive attacks.
More than anything, government 
agencies must concentrate on gen-
eral resilience. Note that resilience is 
desirable in general, not just against 
hostile attacks. Protection against 
T
HE CYBER INSECURITIES of the 
Internet are widely touted 
as precursors of a “Cyber 
Pearl Harbor,” that could by 
some reckonings mark the 
end of civilization. What if this is not 
a grave risk at all? What if the systems 
aspects we point at most frequently as 
the sources of vulnerabilities are actu-
ally assets in tamping down the risk? 
What if we spent more time develop-
ing our ability to be resilient rather 
than to provide absolute security?
Andrew Odlyzko—mathematician, 
cryptographer, author, and informa-
tion technology analyst—has been 
asking these questions and has provid-
ed a thorough analysis. His contrarian 
ideas have provoked controversy.
I talked to him about this.
Q: Military tensions among major 
powers have been escalating in the 
past few years. Government leaders 
are openly worried that a military-
grade preemptive cyber attack could 
devastate a nation. What do you think 
of this?
A: As we increase our reliance on 
digital technologies, attackers will 
find networks of computers increas-
ingly attractive targets. So yes, there 
will surely be a “Cyber Pearl Harbor.” 
We know not the day nor the hour. 
What we have to remember is that a 
devastating cyber event can result not 
only from hostile attacks but also from 
natural events such as solar coronal 
ejections that fry electronics on Earth. 
We are also subject to devastations 
from other events such as convention-
al wars, terror attacks, earthquakes, 
tsunamis, or superstorms. Some di-
sasters are caused by innocent human 
mistakes, too, simple coding or opera-
tional errors, or unanticipated interac-
tions of complex systems. Any of these 
events can lay waste to a region or 
country. It is impossible to prevent all 
these disasters. So the question must 
be: How do we prepare with maximum 
resiliency to recover rapidly? And how 
much of that effort should be devoted 
to security in the cyber realm?
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V features. Attackers are seldom able to make clean penetrations that leave no traces, and when they insert their own malware, they often mess up.Stuxnet—a virus that damaged Ira-nian nuclear centrifuges—is a famous 
example. Although attribution has 
been difficult, security experts have 
placed a strong likelihood that Stuxnet 
was a collaboration between the U.S. 
and Israel, based on the style of coding, 
similarity to other programs, and the 
variable names used. And, of course, 
the creators of Stuxnet did slip up fairly 
substantially in that it escaped into the 
wild from the Iranian facilities.
Q: When I grew up, operating systems 
were much smaller and more cleanly 
organized. Some early operating sys-
tems were under 50-thousand lines 
of code. Today’s major operating 
systems are closing in on 100-mil-
lion lines, and one of the open source 
Linux distributions is near 500 mil-
lion. None of those systems has been 
formally verified. They are cited as 
premier examples of spaghetti code. 
And yet today’s major operating sys-
tems are amazingly reliable com-
pared to the old. How do you explain 
the rise of reliability along with the 
rise of complexity?
A: Much of the progress is due to the 
superabundance of storage space and 
cycles. This enables us to tolerate the 
bloat induced by patches and repairs, 
most of which are to the mass of soft-
ware outside the operating system ker-
nel. The accumulation of patches does 
generally make systems more reliable. 
Further, designers now devote a lot of 
resources to programs that monitor 
other programs and they test far more 
exhaustively than before. Even though 
there are strange states you can push 
systems into—which is what many 
hostile exploits do—those states tend 
not to occur in the situations that mat-
ter to regular users most of the time.
Many of the prescriptions of soft-
ware engineering are violated rou-
tinely. For example, we know how to 
eliminate the continuing vulnerabil-
ity to buffer overruns—but we have 
not done so. Still, progress has been 
substantial. Disciplined coding prac-
tices and isolation techniques such as 
sandboxing have been major factors 
improving reliability.
bioterrorism does not differ much 
from protection against natural pan-
demics. Similarly, restoration of com-
puter networks is similar whether 
they are brought down by a geomag-
netic storm, an electro-magnetic 
pulse from a nuclear explosion in 
space, or a cyber attack.
Q: But what about non-government 
organizations? What should they do?
A: A business or educational insti-
tution should worry primarily about 
the mundane attacks that affect its 
operations. This effort is of general 
value because protection against the 
mundane also reduces exposure to 
massive attacks in the Internet.
Standard measures such as anti-
virus software, firewalls, two-factor 
authentication, security training, and 
basic security practices are what regu-
lar enterprises should concentrate on.
All organizations should make it a 
priority to protect their data through 
regular, hard-to-corrupt backups. The 
ability to restore data is an essential 
part of resilience and recovery.
Enterprises can further increase 
their resiliency by participating in back-
up communication networks, including 
even amateur (ham) radio. And I could 
go on to list more steps of similar na-
ture, all helpful in securing cyberspace.
Q: All the measures you have cited 
are standard ones. They have been 
advocated by security experts for de-
cades. Why has your ACM Ubiquity 
essay (see https://bit.ly/2G5b76S) 
caused controversy?
A: The utter familiarity of this ad-
vice is a key part of my argument. 
We have known for decades of these 
methods for improving cybersecurity. 
They are taught widely in courses and 
discussed in books. They are not se-
cret. Yet most of the damaging cyber 
attacks we have suffered could have 
been prevented by implementing 
those measures.
So the big questions are: Why were 
those steps not taken, and what has 
been the result? My (controversial) 
answer is that cybersecurity has sim-
ply not been very important. The “Cy-
ber Pearl Harbor” scenarios are seen 
as far removed from day-to-day op-
erations of civilian enterprises. What 
they have to deal with is regular crime 
and regular mistakes, similar to what 
they have always faced in the physical 
realm. There have been a few head-
line-grabbing cyber attacks involv-
ing theft of personal identification 
information from firms with large 
databases. These are a small percent-
age of all cyber attacks. These events 
illustrate my point. The companies 
involved did not consider the risk of 
massive theft to be important enough 
to invest in strong security measures. 
They now see that they were wrong.
We have an online ecosystem in 
which crime is being kept within 
bounds by countermeasures by enter-
prises and law enforcement agencies. 
In almost all cases, criminals aim to 
steal data or money without divulging 
their identities or destroying systems.
As the economy and society at large 
increase their dependence on infor-
mation technologies, crime is mi-
grating into cyberspace. As a result, 
more resources are being put into 
cybersecurity. This is happening at a 
measured pace without drastic reen-
gineering of our systems.
Q: Security experts have said that 
much software code is a mess of 
“spaghetti” that cannot be verified as 
correct. There is a dark industry that 
painstakingly searches through the 
tangled codes and sells its findings 
as “zero day exploits” on the black 
market. Purchasers of these exploits 
are able to launch surprise attacks 
and inflict serious damage before the 
victims are able to defend themselves 
with new patches. On what basis have 
you concluded that “spaghetti code” 
is not a great risk?
A: I have not concluded that at all. 
“Spaghetti code” is a risk, and is in-
deed continually being exploited by 
attackers. What I point out is that 
“spaghetti code” also has positive 
More than anything, 
government agencies 
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general resilience.
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Q: You have a reputation for taking 
contrarian stands on issues. This 
seems to result from your desire to 
understand whether popular claims 
stand on solid ground—and frequent-
ly they do not. A few years ago you chal-
lenged Metcalfe’s Law that the value 
of a network grows with the square of 
the number of nodes. What was your 
challenge and what came of that?
A: The argument (developed in a 
paper with Briscoe and Tilly) was that 
Metcalfe’s Law overestimated the 
value of a network. We proposed that 
usually a more accurate measure was 
given by the product of the number of 
nodes and the logarithm of that. This 
proposal has held up quite well. This 
leads to a more realistic view of the 
size of network effects for new tech-
nologies, and therefore of the pros-
pects of new ventures.
More generally, contrary opinions 
do help broaden people’s horizons and 
prepare them for the inevitable surpris-
es. In some cases, the dominant con-
sensus is not just wrong, but leads to 
substantial waste of time and resourc-
es. That is the case with the apocalyp-
tic claims about cybersecurity. There 
is much talk about need for drastic 
action and reengineering our systems 
from the ground up. But this talk is 
not matched by actions. Technologists 
overestimate their chances of making 
big impacts with their radical propos-
als. There is a need for improved secu-
rity technologies, but when we look at 
decisions that are being made, we see 
they implicitly assume that security is 
important but not urgent. This is likely 
to continue. I expect us to continue to 
make good progress in staying ahead of 
criminals and attackers without radical 
changes in Internet and operating sys-
tem architectures. 
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As you mentioned, we are unable 
to formally verify the giant operating 
systems we most rely on. But we can 
formally verify small systems, such as 
those needed to run reliable backup 
systems. Those are key to recovery, 
and thus to resilience.
Q: You have said that some of the still-
popular older technologies for secu-
rity such as firewalls are less secure. 
Can you say more?
A: Firewalls have been getting less 
effective. One reason is that more and 
more of the traffic is encrypted, and 
thus increasingly difficult for firewalls 
to classify. Another is that the entire 
digital environment of the enterprise 
has changed. Originally, firewalls were 
a good way to protect trusted internal 
systems from hostile penetration. To-
day the architecture of enterprises has 
changed considerably. Their systems 
are intertwined with those of suppliers, 
partners, and customers, as well as with 
devices owned by employees. Much 
computation happens in the cloud, not 
the local network. In this environment, 
security professionals have less ability 
to see and control what is happening. 
There is no well-defined security perim-
eter for a firewall to protect.
In addition, far more of the attacks 
rely on human engineering—for ex-
ample, phishing, whaling, ransom-
ware, frauds, deceptions, social engi-
neering. Firewalls cannot stop them.
On the other hand, firewalls con-
tinue to improve. They are far more 
sophisticated than their early incar-
nations of two decades ago. They are 
not about to disappear.
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